

# Social Network Capital, Economic Mobility and Poverty Traps<sup>†</sup>

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August 2008 revision

## Abstract

This paper explores the role social network capital might play in facilitating poor agents' escape from poverty traps. We model and simulate endogenous network formation among households heterogeneously endowed with both traditional and social network capital who make investment and technology choices over time in the absence of financial markets and faced with multiple production technologies featuring different fixed costs and returns. We show that social network capital can serve as either a complement to or a substitute for productive assets in facilitating some poor households' escape from poverty. However, the voluntary nature of costly social network formation also creates both involuntary and voluntary exclusionary mechanisms that impede some poor households' exit from poverty. Through numerical simulation, we show that the ameliorative potential of social networks therefore depends fundamentally on broader socioeconomic conditions, including the underlying wealth distribution in the economy, that determine the feasibility of social interactions and the net intertemporal benefits of social network formation. In some settings, targeted public transfers to the poor can crowd-in private resources by inducing new social links that the poor can exploit to escape from poverty.

JEL Classification Codes: D85, I32, O12, Z13

Keywords: social network capital, endogenous network formation, poverty traps, multiple equilibria, social isolation, social exclusion, crowding-in transfer

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<sup>†</sup> We thank Gary Fields, Matt Jackson, Annemie Maertens, Flaubert Mbiekop, Tewodaj Mogues, Ian Schmutte, Fernando Vega-Redondo and seminar participants at Cornell University, Ohio State University, NEUDC 2006, the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2007, the 2008 European Economic Association Milan Congress 2008 and the 2008 Midwest International Economic Development Conference for helpful comments on earlier versions. Any remaining errors are ours alone.

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# Social Network Capital, Economic Mobility and Poverty Traps

## 1. Introduction

The persistent poverty widely observed in developing countries has motivated much research on poverty traps into which households may fall and from which they have difficulty escaping. The fundamental feature of most poverty trap models centers on the existence of financial market imperfections that impede investment in productive assets or technology, and thus prevent households with poor initial endowments from reaching higher-level equilibria in systems characterized by multiple equilibria.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, a parallel literature emphasizes multiple pathways through which social network capital might facilitate productivity growth, technology adoption and access to (informal) finance.<sup>2</sup> Various studies also document the existence of exclusionary mechanisms that can effectively prevent some poor people from utilizing social networks to promote growth.<sup>3</sup> Advances in understanding the nature and limits of social network capital formation could offer insights into whether and how poor households might avoid or escape poverty traps. There have been some notable recent efforts to make these links explicit.<sup>4</sup>

This paper further explores the intersection between poverty traps and social networks by studying the mechanisms by which endogenous social network capital can facilitate or impede poor households' escape from persistent poverty and the conditions that may affect such mechanisms. While some empirical studies – e.g., Narayan and Pritchett (1999) – find that social network capital effectively serves as a substitute for real capital in mediating economic mobility, others, such as Adato et al. (2006), suggest that accumulation of social network capital proves ineffective for households at the bottom of the economic pyramid in highly polarized economies. What roles might social network capital play in fostering or impeding the poor's economic mobility? Why might

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<sup>1</sup> Examples include Loury (1981), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Dercon (1998), and Mookherjee and Ray (2002, 2003). See Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) or Carter and Barrett (2006) for helpful reviews of key threads in the poverty traps literature.

<sup>2</sup> Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) offer excellent reviews.

<sup>3</sup> For example, Adato et al. (2006), Mogues and Carter (2005) and Santos and Barrett (2006), among others.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the recent volumes by Barrett (2005) and Bowles et al. (2006) and the December 2005 special issue of the *Journal of Economic Inequality* on "Social Groups and Economic Inequality".

endogenous social network formation help some poor households but not others? What determines the poverty reduction potential of social networks? In this paper we develop a simple, stylized optimization model and use simulations to elicit the quite mixed effects of social network capital on poor households' well-being dynamics in order to answer these questions.

The basic structure and intuition of our model runs as follows. Households heterogeneously endowed with privately owned capital assets and social network capital – from endowed (e.g., parents') social networks – choose production technologies, consumption, and investment in assets and in social relationships with others in the economy (that confer future social network capital) so as to maximize their lifetime utility. We assume that social networks are costly to establish and maintain, have no intrinsic value and only function to provide access to partners' (at least partially nonrivalrous) capital that can be used as productive input in the high-return technology. Social networks form endogenously based on mutual consent and result from optimal strategic interaction among all households in an economy. We simplify the setting by assuming perfect information and no financial markets.

In this setting, analogous to other poverty traps models, some initially poor households will be caught in a low-level equilibrium because they lack access, through either endowments, markets or social mechanisms, to the productive assets needed in order for the most productive technology available to be the households' optimal choice, albeit perhaps after a period of initial investment. Initially poor households without such access must resort to autarkic savings if they are to finance later adoption of the improved technology. Some find such investment attractive and thereby climb out of poverty of their own accord. Others find the necessary sacrifice excessive and optimally choose to remain relatively unproductive and thus poor. A third subpopulation might find bootstrapping themselves out of poverty unattractive, but will make the necessary investment if they receive some help from others, i.e., social network capital becomes necessary for an escape from persistent poverty. A fourth subpopulation is able and willing to make the necessary investment autarkically, but will find it more attractive to invest in social relations that offer a lower cost pathway to higher productivity. The initially poor are thus quite a heterogeneous lot, some enjoying independent growth

prospects, others with socially-mediated growth prospects, with social relations either complementing or substituting for own capital in economic mobility, while still others have no real growth prospects at all.

The tricky part of the analysis stems from the fact that (i) social networks represent complex sets of dynamic relationships established non-cooperatively between mutually consenting agents, and (ii) a given relationship or link's net value to any agent depends on the set of other links operational at the same time. Because the social network structure thus evolves endogenously and depends fundamentally on the wealth distribution of the underlying economy, the partitioning of the initially poor among the four subpopulations just identified will vary in both cross-section and time series. This complex interdependency in a setting with multiple and heterogeneous households poses an analytical challenge, which we address using numerical simulations.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the empirical evidence on social network capital and key implications for endogenous network formation in low-income economies relevant to this paper. Section 3 develops a dynamic optimization model with endogenous network formation among heterogeneous households, describes the simple non-convex production technology set and households' unilateral decisions, and explains the game theoretic approach we use to characterize endogenous network formation in this model. Section 4 then describes households' equilibria for any equilibrium network that may arise in this stylized economy. We discuss the roles social networks play and the resulting patterns of economic mobility and immobility using the distinguishable concepts of static and dynamic asset poverty thresholds as a function of asset and social network capital. We also review the model's comparative statics. Section 5 illustrates these results and their implications by simulating randomly generated economies to demonstrate different mobility patterns of households in any economy and of households with identical initial endowments in different economies. The simulations also allow us to show, in section 6, how endogenous social network formation can overturn familiar policy implications generated by models without endogenous social interactions, as when public transfers to the poor no longer crowd-out private transfers but can, instead, crowd them in by inducing the creation of new social links. Section 7 concludes.

## 2. Social network capital

Despite its elusive definitions and applications, a rapidly growing literature on “social capital” emphasizes its potential to obviate market failures in low-income communities. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) distinguish between two broad concepts of social capital identifiable in the literature. First, social capital is sometimes referred to as a stock of trust and associated attachment(s) to a group or to society at large that facilitate coordinated action and the provision of public goods (Coleman 1988, Putnam et al.1993). A second conceptualization treats social capital as an individual asset conferring private benefits (Onchan 1992, Berry 1993, Townsend 1994, Foster and Rosenzweig 1995, Fafchamps 1996, Ghosh and Ray 1996, Kranton 1996, Barr 2000, Bastelaer 2000, Carter and Maluccio 2002, Conley and Udry 2002, Fafchamps and Minten 2002, Isham 2002, Fafchamps 2004, Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Moser and Barrett 2006). We employ the second conceptualization, which is sometimes referred to as “social network capital” so as to emphasize that households gain from linking with others to form social networks for mutual benefit (Granovetter 1995a, Fafchamps and Minten 2002).

The literature identifies various pathways through which social networks might mediate economic growth: improved information flow and informal access to finance for technology adoption, market intelligence or contract monitoring and enforcement, access to loans or insurance, or provision of friendship or other intrinsically valued services. For simplicity, this paper considers the setting where the sole function of a social network is to provide access to link partners’ (at least partially nonrivalrous) productive assets, which are essential for adoption of the high-return technology. Intuitively, this can be understood as sharing or borrowing tools, equipment or even animal or human labor, obtaining nonrivalrous capital-specific information, etc., which are costly, productive inputs in high-return production.<sup>5</sup> For example, a farmer’s social link to another farmer might afford free access to the latter’s tractor or at least to information that reduces tractor acquisition or operating costs if the farmer opts to buy a tractor himself. The social network in our

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<sup>5</sup> Note that such access does not need to be equivalent to that of the asset owner; it merely needs to be superior to that of others who do not have similar social access so that socially-mediated capital access reduces fixed costs of operating the high-return technology. We develop this further in section 3.1.

setting thus has purely instrumental value in allowing one to accumulate social network capital, naturally defined as socially-mediated access to others' productive assets.

Social network capital is assumed to be productive only in the high-return production, but incompatible with the low-return, subsistent level of production. It is thus (imperfectly) substitutable for traditional, privately possessed capital.

The prospective benefits of social network capital create material incentives to establish social relations with others, even when it is costly to establish and maintain such relationships. The formation of a social network of bilateral relationships is thus a form of investment, akin to more conventional investment in traditional financial, natural or physical capital.

Social networks necessarily evolve endogenously. A small but growing literature demonstrates this empirically in the case of poor agrarian communities (Conley and Udry 2001, Fafchamps and Minten 2001, DeWeerd 2004, Santos and Barrett 2005, Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). Because social networks are (at least partly) the consequences of individual's cost-benefit calculus with respect to prospective links with others, and those costs and benefits depend on social distance and the underlying structure of the economy, network structure is highly variable.

Theorists have for some time offered insightful strategic models of endogenous network formation, building on seminal works by Aumann and Myerson (1988), Myerson (1991) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), among others. In recent years, formal theoretical models of network formation have been increasingly applied in development economics (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004, Conley and Udry 2005, Genicot and Ray 2005, Mogues and Carter 2005, Bloch et al. 2006). Nonetheless, most of the social networks studies related to economic development have been empirical, and in aggregate strongly suggest that not everyone benefits from social networks and that there exist patterns to failures to form network links (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). For example, Figueroa et al. (1996) point out that social exclusion has become a very active subject of debate concerning poverty in Europe. Carter and May (2001) and Adato et al. (2006) show that the voluntary and involuntary exclusion of poorer black households from the social networks of wealthier whites in South Africa has prolonged the legacy of apartheid and minimized the prospective benefits of social capital to the poor via obviating barriers

to entry into remunerative livelihoods. Santos and Barrett (2006) find that asset transfers through social networks in southern Ethiopia systematically exclude poorer households, corroborating insights from anthropologists and historians studying similar systems across rural Africa.

Nonrandom patterns of unformed latent social links within a society reflect choices made by individuals to forego prospective relationships. We refer to the situation where an individual opts not to seek out partners as “social isolation”, reflecting voluntary self-selection out of prospective networks.<sup>6</sup> In other cases, individuals desire links with others but are rebuffed by prospective partners, resulting in involuntary “social exclusion”.<sup>7</sup> We demonstrate below how patterns of social exclusion and isolation may turn fundamentally on the initial wealth distribution in an economy, with significant consequences for the growth prospects for the poor.<sup>8</sup> In this way, models of endogenous social network capital as an input into productivity growth provide a natural link between the social networks literature and that relating income distribution to economic growth.<sup>9</sup> Having situated this paper in the broader literature and laid out the core intuition and concepts, we now explain our stylized model in detail.

### 3. A simple dynamic optimization model with endogenous network formation

Assume  $n$  households exist in an economy,  $N = (1, 2, \dots, n)$ . Each lives for two periods,<sup>10</sup>  $t = 0, 1$ . Each household  $i$  is initially endowed with two types of assets: traditional productive capital, denoted  $A_{i0}$ , representing a one-dimensional aggregate index measure of physical, natural, human and financial capital, and social network

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<sup>6</sup> Postlewaite and Silverman (2005), Kuznetsov (2001), Barry (1998), Wilson (1987), among others, similarly use the concept and term “social isolation” to reflect voluntary non-participation in a society’s institutions.

<sup>7</sup> Note that we use the term “social exclusion” very precisely, especially as compared to the literature on social exclusion as, more generally, “inability of a person to participate in basic day-to-day economic and social activities of life” (Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio 2006, p.397), as the term is used by, among others, Room (1995), Atkinson (1998), Atkinson et al. (2002), and Bossert et al. (2007).

<sup>8</sup> We only directly refer to social isolation and social exclusion with respect to those agents who remain poor over time and do not establish social networks. Extension to those non-poor who similarly do not link with others is straightforward, but omitted in the interest of focus on the paper’s core poverty traps theme.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Galor and Zeira (1993) or Mookherjee and Ray (2000), as well as the excellent review by Aghion et al. (1999).

<sup>10</sup> Population growth is assumed zero for both periods.

capital, denoted  $S_{i0}$ , referring to the traditional capital that might be acquirable from others in the endowed (e.g., parents') social network. There is thus just one type of individually owned asset, but people can have access to it directly through private ownership or indirectly through their social network. The economy's initial endowment distribution is denoted by  $\lambda(A_0, S_0)$ . Households' preferences are identical, with utility derived solely from consumption, as is the set of available production technologies to generate income from one's capital stock.

### 3.1 Production technology set

The available production technology set in this economy consists of two technique-specific production functions that generate low and high income at any period  $t$ ,  $Y_t^L$  and  $Y_t^H$ , respectively, through

$$Y_t^L = f_L(A_t) \tag{1}$$

$$Y_t^H = f_H(A_t - F(S_t)) \text{ with } F(S_t) \geq 0, -1 < F'(S_t) < 0 \text{ and } F(\infty) = 0. \tag{2}$$

Technology  $L$  is a low-cost, low-return technique that everyone can afford. Technology  $H$  is a high-return technology with a fixed cost entry barrier,  $F(S_t) \geq 0$ . Greater capital is thus required to make technology  $H$  attractive because one has to cover the fixed cost of operation (i.e., this is not a one-time sunk cost of adoption). Social network capital reduces the fixed cost of using the high-return technology and is thus an imperfect substitute for owned capital.

Each production technology fulfills standard curvature conditions. For net productive assets,  $NA_t^H \equiv A_t - F(S_t) \geq 0$  and  $NA_t^L \equiv A_t \geq 0$ , (almost everywhere) twice-differentiable functions  $f_H(NA_t^H)$  and  $f_L(NA_t^L)$  follow

$$f_H(0) = f_L(0) = 0 \tag{3}$$

$$\frac{\partial f_H(0)}{\partial NA_t^H} = \frac{\partial f_L(0)}{\partial NA_t^L} = \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial f_H(\infty)}{\partial NA_t^H} = \frac{\partial f_L(\infty)}{\partial NA_t^L} = 0 \tag{4}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 f_H(NA_t^H)}{\partial (NA_t^H)^2} \leq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 f_L(NA_t^L)}{\partial (NA_t^L)^2} \leq 0 \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{\partial f_H(NA_t^H)}{\partial NA_t^H} \Big|_{NA_t=j} \geq \frac{\partial f_L(NA_t^L)}{\partial NA_t^L} \Big|_{NA_t=j} \geq 0 \quad \forall j. \quad (6)$$

In each period  $t$ , therefore, a household  $i$ 's aggregate production function can be described as

$$Y_{it} = \text{Max} [ Y_{it}^H, Y_{it}^L ] = \text{Max} [ f_H(A_{it} - F(S_{it})), f_L(A_{it}) ] \quad (7)$$

which yields a non-convex production set, with locally increasing returns in the neighborhood of  $\underline{A}(S_{it})$ , the asset threshold beyond which a household will optimally switch to the high-return production technology.  $\underline{A}(S_{it})$  thus satisfies

$$f_H [ \underline{A}(S_{it}) - F(S_{it}) ] = f_L [ \underline{A}(S_{it}) ]. \quad (8)$$

Figure 1 presents this aggregate production function as an outer envelope of the two specific production functions, with the threshold asset stock  $\underline{A}(S_{it})$ .<sup>11</sup>

Social network capital thereby reduces the private asset stock necessary to make technology  $H$  optimal. As  $S_{it}$  increases, the high-return production function shifts in, lowering the minimum asset threshold needed to make high-return production optimal, i.e.,  $\underline{A}'(S_{it}) < 0$ , which follows implicitly from (8) and the assumption that  $F(\cdot)$  is decreasing in  $S_{it}$ . This effect is depicted in Figure 2.

An obvious implication is that the value of social network capital will vary across households. For households with sufficient privately-held assets,  $A_{kt} \geq \underline{A}(S_{kt})$ , adoption of  $H$  is optimal regardless of their stock of social network capital, but  $S_{it}$  nonetheless reduces the fixed costs they incur, thereby increasing the productivity of their asset stock. Their investment incentives are thus driven by the relative costs of investment in social network capital and traditional, privately held assets.

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<sup>11</sup> This is in the spirit of Cooper (1987), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) or Azariadis and Drazen (1990), each of whom exploits similar technologies to analyze multiple equilibria. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) discuss how this type of non-convexity can arise as firms internally coordinate many complementary activities. Durlauf (1993) explores the role of complementarities and incomplete markets in economic growth under non-convexities of this type and shows that localized technological complementarities, when strong enough, produce long-run multiple equilibria.

Social network capital is potentially most valuable for those households  $k$  who possess insufficient assets themselves to adopt  $H$ ,  $A_{kt} < \underline{A}(S_{kt})$ , but who are “not too far” in some sense from  $\underline{A}(S_{kt})$  so that investment in building social network capital can lower the critical threshold they face to the point that the high-return technology becomes optimal in the future. Because social network capital has no value for those who do not employ technology  $H$ , however, as one’s distance from  $\underline{A}(S_{kt})$  increases the prospective benefit from increased future social network capital eventually falls once it will not suffice to bring the threshold down far enough, given the household’s current and prospective asset stock. For such households, there is no incentive to invest in social network capital, thus they will rationally self-select out of costly social relations, thereby becoming socially isolated.

### 3.2 Household utility maximization

A household  $i$  derives utility solely from consumption each period, maximizing

$$U_i = u(C_{i0}) + \rho u(C_{i1}) \quad (9)$$

where  $\rho$  is the discount factor. We further assume there are no financial markets, thus autarkic saving is the only investment strategy. A subsistence consumption constraint applies such that for any level of consumption necessary for survival  $\bar{C} > 0$ ;

$$u(C_{it}) = -\infty \quad \text{for any } C_{it} < \bar{C} \text{ and } r \leq t. \quad (10)$$

This puts a minimal limit on the intertemporal consumption tradeoff available to the household by permanently penalizing extremely low consumption in any period.

In period 0, a household  $i$  with endowments  $(A_{i0}, S_{i0})$  optimally chooses a production technology and allocates the resulting income from production among consumption  $(C_{i0})$ , investment in productive assets  $(I_{i0})$  and investment in its social network  $(X'_{i0}K_i)$ , which is the product of its network  $(X_{i0})$  – the binary (0,1) column vector reflecting the combination of social relationships it establishes during period 0 –

and the column vector of costs the household has to incur to establish or maintain<sup>12</sup> these relationships ( $K_i$ ).<sup>13</sup>

Note that the household incurs costs in period 0 for establishing network  $X_{i0}$ , but it derives no immediate benefits. The laws of motion mapping initial endowments into stocks at the beginning of period 1 depreciate  $A_{i0}$  and  $S_{i0}$  at rates  $\delta_A$  and  $\delta_S$ , respectively, while period 0 investments add to the stock of both assets. The new stock of social network capital is a function of the household's social network at the end of period 0 and the benefit function ( $B_i$ ) that maps proportion of assets held by members of its established network into social network capital, as described in section 4. In period 1, the household again chooses the optimal production technology and consumes all the resulting income.<sup>14</sup>

A key distinction between  $A$  and  $S$  is that the household unilaterally decides the stock of traditional capital it will own, but it does not unilaterally decide on its social network because each social link involves bilateral decisions by both prospective partners. The household's social network is therefore the product of optimal social interactions, taking into consideration everyone in the economy's network preferences. A household's utility maximizing network might therefore prove infeasible because its preferred link partners do not have reciprocal desires for an active link. In modeling the household's decision, we thus define  $X_{i0}^u = X_{i0}(X_{-i0})$  as household  $i$ 's desired, unilateral network choice conditional on others' choices, denoted by  $X_{-i0}$ .

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<sup>12</sup> Because, realistically, some agents begin with inherited social network capital – e.g., familial ties with biological relatives and parents' close associates – we assume that household's endowed social network capital exists independent of its de novo network link choices, subject only to a uniform rate of depreciation of the social network capital – think of this as mortality or out-migration of pre-existing ties.

<sup>13</sup> Both  $K_i$  and  $X_{i0}$  are described in more detail in the next section.

<sup>14</sup> Zero investment in the terminal period is obviously an artefact of our simplifying assumption of a known, finite lifetime with no subsequent generations.

Specifically, the indirect utility that household  $i$  with endowments  $(A_{i0}, S_{i0})$  derives from a possible network choice  $X_{i0}^u$  is simply

$$V_i^*(X_{i0}^u) = \underset{\{C_{i0}(X_{i0}^u), I_{i0}(X_{i0}^u), C_{i1}(X_{i0}^u)\}}{\text{Max}} u(C_{i0}) + \rho u(C_{i1}) \quad (11)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{subject to:} \quad & C_{i0} \leq Y_{i0}(A_{i0}, S_{i0}) - I_{i0} - X_{i0}^u K_i \\ & A_{i1} = (1 - \delta_A) A_{i0} + I_{i0} \\ & S_{i1} = (1 - \delta_S) S_{i0} + X_{i0}^u B_i \\ & C_{i1} \leq Y_{i1}(A_{i1}, S_{i1}) \\ & S_{i1}, A_{i1} \geq 0 \\ & C_{i0}, C_{i1} \geq \bar{C}. \end{aligned}$$

The production function follows (7) and the subsistence constraint is incorporated into the final constraint on consumption. Each household can perform intertemporal cost-benefit calculus for any of their network choices conditional on choices of others. We now detail the specifications for the endogenous network formation and the suitable equilibrium concept in order to resolve this intertemporal optimization problem.

### 3.3 Endogenous network formation

Because the formation of links is a strategic decision affecting households' optimal consumption and investment decisions, we model network formation as a non-cooperative game in which link formation is based on a binary process of mutual consent between individuals who costlessly observe the current wealth distribution. Due to the multiplicity of equilibria, many of which make little sense from a social network perspective, we reduce the range of feasible equilibria through imposing two restrictions. The first follows from the fact, well-established in sociology, that active social networks are primarily formed among individuals already acquainted with one another. This implies a central role for social distance in determining the net benefits of active link formation. We let social distance affect the individual-specific costs and benefits of link formation in a way that helps limit the range of prospective links to a domain over which they are most likely. Second, we model network formation using an extensive form game of link formation

with perfect information, which allows us to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) social network in this economy.

### 3.3.1 Social distance, feasible interactions and link-specific cost-benefit analysis

A broad literature suggests there exist boundaries to prospective social interactions. Santos and Barrett (2005, 2006), among others, find that not everyone knows everyone else, even in small, ethnically homogeneous rural settings in which households pursue the same livelihood, and that knowing someone is effectively a precondition to establishing an active link. Consistent with this, many models of network formation emphasize local interactions within prescribed neighborhoods (Ellison 1993, Ellison and Fudenberg 1993, Fagiolo 2001).

In our setting, each household is characterized by its universally observable  $(A_0, S_0)$  endowment. Thus each household can identify its social distance from every other household in  $(A, S)$  space. As in Akerlof (1997) or Mogue and Carter (2005), we use the geometric distance between households' endowments to reflect social distance,

$$d(i, j) = \sqrt{(A_{i0} - A_{j0})^2 + \alpha(S_{i0} - S_{j0})^2} \quad ; \quad \alpha \geq 0, \quad (12)$$

for any pair of households,  $i$  and  $j$ , where  $\alpha$  establishes the relative weight of pre-existing social network capital in determining social distance. Conceptually, social distance measures relative proximity between two households, which reflects the degree of discomfort in their social interaction. It can thus serve as a proxy for the cost of establishing and maintaining a social relationship.

Formally, a household  $i$  incurs total costs of  $X'_{i0} K_i$  to establish its network of links  $X_{i0}$ , where  $K_i$  is a column vector of costs they have to incur to establish each active link. To keep the analysis as general as possible, the economic cost to household  $i$  to establish a link with household  $j$  can be written as

$$K_i(j) = k(d(i, j)) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} A_{j0} \\ A_{i0} \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{with } k' > 0 \text{ for } d(i, j) \leq \bar{d}, \quad k' = \infty \text{ otherwise.} \quad (13)$$

The idea is that it is easier to establish a link with people who are socially proximate, hence the cost function  $k(d(i, j))$  that is increasing in  $d$ . Further, we allow for asymmetric

costs, here specified such that the poorer partner incurs more costs in link formation. We assume no economies of scale or scope in building networks.

The constant  $\bar{d}$  reflects a social distance threshold beyond which social interaction is not feasible.<sup>15</sup> In our context,  $\bar{d}$  is economy-specific but universal to each household in the economy.<sup>16</sup> It implicitly reflects physical and social barriers on the probability that individuals meet and interact. A low  $\bar{d}$  can represent an economy in which households cluster into many small groups of shared characteristics with low inter-group connectivity or an economy characterized by significant ethnic, racial or religious discrimination or physical isolation. A high  $\bar{d}$ , on the other hand, allows for greater social interactions.

The benefits to household  $i$  from the active links in its social network are reflected in the column vector  $B_i$ , mapping some proportion of its partners' asset endowments into augmentation of its social network capital next period. Specifically, the gross benefit to household  $i$  from a link with household  $j$  follows

$$B_i(j) = b(A_{j0}, |A_{i0} - A_{j0}|) \quad \text{where } 0 < b_1' < 1, -1 < b_2' < 0 \quad (14)$$

Implicitly,  $0 < b_1' < 1$  emphasizes the nature of access to link partners' (at least partially nonrivalrous) capital.<sup>17</sup> This generalization is highly stylized but very intuitive. Some components of the composite asset are nonrivalrous (e.g., equipment-specific knowledge). Others, such as tools and equipment, can be shared and thus used at different time without materially affecting the owner's (or other borrowers') use, but perhaps with degraded performance for the borrower (e.g., due to imperfect timing). Whether one considers this unfettered, occasional or probabilistic access, the key is that  $i$ 's access to socially-mediated capital is increasing in the stock of links' privately-held assets.

As with the costs of links, we assume that social network capital benefits are link-specific and independent of all other links the household establishes. The social network capital gained from a link is not symmetric to both members of the dyad for the simple

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<sup>15</sup> In the language of the networks literature,  $\bar{d}$  distinguishes between local and global interactions.

<sup>16</sup> This assumption is reasonable give households' identical preferences. The sensible extension of this context is to allow  $\bar{d}$  to vary with other socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., initial endowments, groups).

<sup>17</sup> Note that in this simple model, benefits are only generated from direct links. There are no benefits from being connected to other households indirectly through one's direct links.

reason that a poorer household can call on more resources from their richer partner than vice versa. Extreme differences in wealth, however, may hinder mutual benefits, as reflected in the second argument in (14). Intuitively, the specific capital of one partner might be inappropriate to a partner employing quite different practices due to stark wealth differences. More generally, the asymmetric specification of (14) fits the empirical pattern that wealthy households are more likely to opt out of links with much poorer partners than vice versa (Santos and Barrett 2005). In similar spirit, very poor households might not find it attractive to link with far richer ones with whom they share little (Mogues and Carter 2005).

Two fundamental points distinguish our network formation model from others. First, costs and benefits of links are realized intertemporally.<sup>18</sup> A household's preference over possible networks, therefore, relies on its realized net intertemporal utility gains. Second, household  $i$ 's decision to link with household  $j$  is interdependent with its decision to link with others. A link with one household might complement or substitute for links with others. The multiple equilibria in our setting accentuate this interdependency because only those households that can accumulate enough resources to make the high-return production technology optimal will benefit from social network capital. Therefore, many households' valuation of a given link is conditional on their success in establishing other links as well. To take into account these spillover possibilities, households' network strategies involve choosing among possible networks of links, instead of just myopically considering each link separately.

We use the notation  $ij$  to describe the binary link between households  $i$  and  $j$ . According to (13), social links can be established within the feasible interaction space determined by  $\bar{d}$ . The network of household  $i$ , reflecting the combination of its binary links, is represented by the vector:

$$X_i = (x(ij) / j \in N, j \neq i, d(i, j) \leq \bar{d}) \quad \text{where } x(ij) \in \{0,1\}. \quad (15)$$

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<sup>18</sup> In existing network formation models, relationship payoffs occur within the period (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, Johnson and Gilles 2000, Calvo-Armensol and Jackson 2001, Goyal and Joshi 2002).

The binary index  $x(ij)$  is defined by joint agreement to establish a link,  $x(ij)=1$ , otherwise  $x(ij)=0$ . Household  $i$ 's set of all feasible networks can then be represented by  $\Omega_i = \{X_i / x(ij) \in \{0,1\}\}$ .

By way of illustration, consider an economy with  $N = \{1,2,3,4,5\}$  and the endowment distribution  $\lambda(A_0, S_0)$  illustrated in figure 3. For  $\bar{d} = 9$ , for example,

household 3's network can be generally represented by  $X_3 = \begin{pmatrix} x(31) \\ x(32) \\ x(34) \end{pmatrix}$  with  $x(3k) \in \{0,1\}$

for all  $k=1,2,4$ . Clearly interaction between 3 and 5 is not feasible because

$d(3,5) > \bar{d} = 9$ . Hypothetically,  $X_3 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$  represents household 3's network that consists

of only a link with household 1.  $X_3 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$  arises when 3 establishes links with everyone

with whom interaction is feasible, while  $X_3 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$  presents the case where household 3

has no links.  $\Omega_3 = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \right\}$  thus represents the set of all

feasible network.

The indirect utility  $V_i^*(X_i)$  associated with the network choice  $X_i$ <sup>19</sup> can naturally be used to compare among household  $i$ 's feasible networks. And thus household's preference over the feasible networks can be obtained by ranking their feasible networks based on the corresponding  $V_i^*(X_i)$ . Strategic interactions among all households in the economy then involve households choosing their network of social links from the set of

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<sup>19</sup> The time index  $t = 0$  is dropped here. In the next section, however, the optimal network is denoted as  $X_{i0}^*$ .

feasible ones using the resulting set of ranked networks,  $\Omega_i^{Ranked}$  as their reaction function in an extensive form game of link formation, which we now describe.

### **3.3.2 Linking game with perfect information**

Because network link formation is a strategic decision affecting households' optimal consumption and investment decisions, it is natural to model network formation as a non-cooperative game. The mutual consent requirement of link formation poses a hurdle, however, to the use of any off-the-shelf solution technique, especially due to issues of multiplicity and stability of equilibria (Jackson 2005). Reviewing models of link formation, Jackson (2005) concludes that the mutual consent requirement for link formation implies either some sort of coalitional equilibrium concept or an extensive form game with a protocol for proposing and accepting links in some sequence. As the purpose of this paper is not to study the nature of network formation per se, but rather to use a sensible equilibrium network concept to analyze the ways in which the resulting social network capital mediates economic mobility, we opt for the latter approach and develop a reasonable extensive form game of network formation with perfect information that yields a SPNE network.

We model households attempting to establish their utility maximizing network as players interacting over multiple rounds of link proposing, accepting and rejecting, using  $\Omega_i^{Ranked}$  as their best response function. This extensive form game thus involves an algorithm for proposing and accepting links that yields a sequential matching process.<sup>20</sup> At the beginning of the game there are no pre-established links between any player households.<sup>21</sup> Initially, households consider their top-ranked network. They simultaneously propose to each of the other households with which they wish to link. The link between two households is established if and only if (i) both agents propose to each

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<sup>20</sup> This specification is in the context of a matching game in the domain of a coalitional game, in which each household may be matched with many others. Our matching specification differs greatly, however, from Gale and Shapley's (1962) original approach, which considers a two-sided one-to-one matching game in which members of two sides are referred to as  $Xs$  and  $Ys$ . It also differs from marriage models and the roommates problem in which individuals can match with only one partner.

<sup>21</sup> Think of  $S_0$  as reflecting one's inherited links with an older generation and the network choice,  $X_i$ , as being with one's own generation.

other, and (ii) at least one of the two partners optimizes its network (i.e., has all of its proposals accepted). Once a household optimizes its network, its game is concluded. For any of its partners that do not likewise optimize their networks, these established links are binding. Such partners continue to play the game, with their utility maximization now constrained by the link commitment. All households that do not optimize their networks in a proposal round move on to the next round, when they again simultaneously propose to each of those households still active in the game with whom they wish to link in their top-ranked still-feasible network (which must include any pre-existing link commitments from prior rounds with households that have concluded play). The same link formation rule is followed. The game then repeats itself if there remain households without optimized networks. The entire history of offers, acceptances and rejections is known to all households.

If no household can optimize its network in a specific stage, and thus no binding link can be established, we assume that the poorest household (i.e., the one with lowest  $A_0$ ) has to forego its top-ranked network and instead use its second-best network while the rest still play their top-ranked networks. If still no one can optimize the network, the second poorest household then sacrifices its first-best network and must make link proposals to its second-best network while all richer households still play their first-best strategy, and so on. The process of sequential matching continues until everyone optimizes their networks following the protocol outlined above. For any preferences, the process eventually stops because there exists a finite set of households in this economy.

This process results in a set of links. We will denote this set by  $g$ . Household  $i$ 's social network derived from this resulting set of link  $g$  can then be denoted  $X_i(g)$ . The payoff to each household  $i$  is then defined by the corresponding indirect utility  $V_i^*(X_i(g))$ . Given perfect information, this protocol generates a SNPE in pure strategies (Selten 1975).

Figure 4 provides a numerical illustration of this algorithm and its SPNE for the five player example economy from Figure 3. Note three interesting aspects of this proposed game. First, even if proposals are matched, this does not guarantee the establishment of a link. Binding links are established only if (at least) one partner optimizes its network. This follows directly from the fact that households' preferences with respect to individual links

are governed by their preferences over their broader networks, as reflected in  $\Omega_i^{Ranked}$ . Second, households' optimal networks in equilibrium are not necessarily their first-best ones, due to the interactive nature of the link formation process and the spillovers inherent to the process economywide. This creates a stark contrast vis-à-vis the optimality conditions that would result from unilateral decisions regarding social network structure. Third, the game's SPNE network tends to favor those households able and/or preferring to link with a small number of others.<sup>22</sup>

We then use 100 randomly generated economies to explore some simple properties of this endogenous network formation. Appendix 2 reports the details of the baseline parameterization of the model. Appendix 3 includes detailed results of sensitivity analysis performed by varying some of the more important parameter values. Explicit examination of other properties of this extensive game with large number of heterogeneous players is very difficult<sup>23</sup> and is not in the objective of this paper.

#### 4. Households' equilibria and patterns of economic mobility

Due to the mutual consent requirement for link formation, household  $i$ 's optimal network in the SPNE of the extensive form game just described constrains the optima for each household in the economy, not just for  $i$ 's optimal technology choice, welfare, etc. The equilibria of this model are, therefore, characterized by every household's accumulation decisions,  $\{X_{i0}^*, I_{i0}^*\}_{i=1, \dots, n}$ , which determine current and future technology choice, consumption levels, and thus each household's level of well-being.

The preceding model specifications prepare us now to study how social network capital influences households' economic mobility through their optimal network formation and capital accumulation decisions. We study a general case where each

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<sup>22</sup> This is illustrated in the simulation statistics in Appendix 1. Those for whom no links are feasible or who do not wish to establish any social links (i.e., socially isolated households) necessarily always get their first-best network. Thereafter, the proportion of households attaining their first-best network in equilibrium is declining monotonically in desired network size (Figure A2) and non-monotonically in feasible network size (Figure A1). This merely reflects that more complex networks are harder to establish.

<sup>23</sup> Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000), among others, successfully analyze these sorts of extensive game, but with only three players.

household  $i$ , initially endowed with  $(A_{i0}, S_{i0})$ , faces the unilateral intertemporal utility maximization problem (11) with the general instantaneous utility function:

$$u(C_{it}) = \frac{C_{it}^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \quad ; \quad 0 \leq \theta < 1, \quad (16)$$

where  $\theta$  determines the household's willingness to shift consumption between periods. The smaller is  $\theta$ , the more slowly marginal utility falls as consumption rises, and so the more willing the household is to allow its consumption to vary over time. We consider the non-convex production technology set in each period  $t = 0,1$  described in (7) in the general Cobb-Douglas form

$$Y(A_{it}, S_{it}) = \text{Max} [ k_1 (A_{it})^{\alpha_1}, k_2 (A_{it} - F(S_{it}))^{\alpha_2} ], \quad 0 < \alpha_1, \alpha_2 < 1, \alpha_2 > \alpha_1, k_1, k_2 > 0. \quad (17)$$

We specifically concentrate on the setting in which high-return production is always preferable to the lower return technology. Without the borrowing constraint, every household would gradually converge to this superior equilibrium, whether through borrowing, autarkic savings, or both. The assumptions of constrained autarkic savings – per (10) – and no borrowing thus lead to the existence of multiple equilibria, one of which is the poverty trap associated with continued use of the low-return technology.

#### 4.1 The benchmark case without a social network

We now analyze the benchmark case without social networks, in which the household's optimal welfare depends solely on its autarkic savings and accumulation capacity. The next subsection then expands the analysis to consider the case in which households can form social networks and explores how this affects economic mobility, especially among those who might otherwise be trapped in poverty.

The case where  $S_{it} = 0 \forall t$ , implying no functioning social network, replicates a traditional poverty traps model. The non-convex production set in (17) implies an asset threshold  $\underline{A}$  such that, at any period  $t$ , those with  $A_t \geq \underline{A}$  can optimally undertake high-return production.<sup>24</sup> For simplicity's sake, assume those who choose the low return technology (the first argument on the right-hand side of (17)) generate income that leaves

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<sup>24</sup>  $\underline{A}$  satisfies a condition analogous to that in (8).

them poor while those who choose the high-return technology (the second argument on the right-hand side of (17)) earn income that renders them non-poor. Thus threshold  $\underline{A}$  represents a static asset poverty line, which distinguishes *current* poor from non-poor. In any period  $t$ , the poor in our context are, therefore, those households with  $A_t < \underline{A}$ , i.e., those currently undertaking low-return production.

Household  $i$ 's first-order conditions for an interior optimum thus potentially yield two equilibria: the low-level equilibrium (poverty trap)  $U_{iL}^*(S_{i0} = 0, X_{i0} = \underline{0})$  and the high-level equilibrium  $U_{iH}^*(S_{i0} = 0, X_{i0} = \underline{0})$ .<sup>25</sup> At the superior one, the household equates the loss to lifetime utility due to foregone present consumption with the discounted utility gain that results from investment in the high-return production technology according to

$$(C_{i0H}^*)^{-\theta} = \rho(C_{i1H}^*)^{-\theta} \cdot \alpha_2 k_2 (A_{i1H}^* - F(0))^{\alpha_2 - 1} . \quad (18)$$

The second term on the right side of (18) represents the marginal return of the high-return production evaluated at the optimal net asset in the last period. Analogous to the Euler equation, this equation describes the household's equilibrium behavior such that the accumulated asset stock in equilibrium is

$$A_{i1H}^* = \left( (\rho \alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*}{C_{i1H}^*} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F(0) . \quad (19)$$

This yields optimal first period consumption of

$$C_{i0H}^* = Y(A_{i0}) - \left[ \left( (\rho \alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*}{C_{i1H}^*} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F(0) - (1 - \delta_A) A_{i0} \right] . \quad (20)$$

where the second term on the right-hand side represents the optimal investment requirement to achieve the high-level equilibrium. Only those households who can afford the corresponding autarkic savings (i.e.,  $C_{i0H}^* \geq \bar{C}$ ) will converge to this superior equilibrium. They derive the optimal consumption in the terminal period,

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<sup>25</sup> To ensure the existence of the equilibria, we assume that accumulation toward  $U_{iL}^*$  is at least feasible, i.e., for every household  $i$ ,  $C_{i0L}^* \geq \bar{C}$ .

$C_{iH}^* = k_2(A_{iH}^* - F(0))^{\alpha_2}$ . The lower  $\theta$  – i.e., the more willing they are to substitute consumption between the two periods – the more the household saves in response to the high-return potential. In the limiting case of linear utility (when  $\theta = 0$ ), household's elasticity of intertemporal substitution becomes  $\infty$ , yielding maximal willingness to bear short-term reductions in current consumption in order to take advantage of high future returns on investment.

In the low-level poverty trap equilibrium, by contrast, the Euler equation describing household behavior implies optimal asset holdings such that

$$\frac{C_{iLL}^*}{C_{i0L}^*} = \left( \rho \alpha_1 k_1 (A_{iLL}^*)^{\alpha_1 - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Leftrightarrow A_{iLL}^* = \left( \rho \alpha_1 k_1 \left( \frac{C_{i0L}^*}{C_{iLL}^*} \right)^{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha_1}}. \quad (21)$$

corresponding to optimal first period consumption of

$$C_{i0L}^* = Y(A_{i0}) - \left[ \left( \rho \alpha_1 k_1 \left( \frac{C_{i0L}^*}{C_{iLL}^*} \right)^{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha_1}} - (1 - \delta_A) A_{i0} \right]. \quad (22)$$

Now consider the benchmark setting where it is possible for some initially poor household to escape poverty. Formally, an initially poor household graduates to the high-level equilibrium, and thereby escapes poverty, through autarkic savings if and only if

$$C_{i0H}^* = k_1(A_{i0})^{\alpha_1} - \left[ \left( \rho \alpha_2 k_2 \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*}{C_{i1H}^*} \right)^{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha_2}} + F(0) - (1 - \delta_A) A_{i0} \right] \geq \bar{C}. \quad (23)$$

Typical for any poverty trap model, (18) and (23) suggests the existence of a dynamic asset threshold  $A_0^*$  at which optimal household savings (i.e., asset accumulation) bifurcates. Those initially poor households with  $\underline{A} > A_{i0} \geq A_0^{*26}$  will save and escape

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<sup>26</sup> Given our assumptions, it is necessarily true that  $A_0^* \leq \underline{A}$ . By way of proof, suppose instead that  $A_0^* > \underline{A}$  and consider an individual endowed with  $\underline{A} < A_{i0} < A_0^*$ . As  $\underline{A} < A_{i0}$ ,  $k_1(A_{i0})^{\alpha_1} < k_2(A_{i0} - F(0))^{\alpha_2}$ , and so the household can initially adopt high-return production technology. Thus,  $Y(A_0) = k_2(A_{i0} - F(0))^{\alpha_2}$ . But as  $A_{i0} < A_0^*$ ,  $C_{i0H}^* < \bar{C}$  implies  $k_2(A_{i0} - F(0))^{\alpha_2} + (1 - \delta_A) A_{i0} - (\rho \alpha_2 k_2)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha_2}} - F(0) < \bar{C}$ . This, however, contradicts (23).

poverty in the future (albeit not in the initial period), while other poor with  $A_{i0} < A_0^*$  are trapped in long-term poverty. This dynamic asset threshold is analogous to the *dynamic asset poverty line* proposed by Carter and Barrett (2006). In the absence of social network capital, a household's initial endowment of productive assets,  $A_{i0}$ , determines its long-term equilibrium well-being. Note also that by this construction initially non-poor households (whose  $A_{i0} \geq \underline{A} > A_0^*$ ) are always able to achieve the high-return equilibrium.<sup>27</sup>

#### 4.2 The possibilities presented by social networks and their limitations

Let us now introduce the possibility of social network capital that reduces the fixed cost associated with using the high-return production technique. This generalizes the static asset poverty line  $\underline{A}(S_t)$  such that any household with  $A_{i0} \geq \underline{A}(S_{i0})$  optimally undertakes high-return production in period 0, while those with  $A_{i0} < \underline{A}(S_{i0})$  optimally choose the low-return technique in the first period.  $\underline{A}(S_{i0})$  thus solves

$$k_1[\underline{A}(S_{i0})]^{\alpha_1} = k_2[\underline{A}(S_{i0}) - F(S_{i0})]^{\alpha_2} \quad (24)$$

with  $\underline{A}'(S_{i0}) < 0$ , so that greater social network capital lowers the static asset poverty line, as previously discussed in section 3.1. In this way, one's inherited social network capital can make high-return production technologies, and thus a higher equilibrium standard of living, immediately attainable when one's private stock of capital would not otherwise suffice. Further, those endowed with adequate social network capital might not need to invest in building further social links so as to accumulate social network capital.

The existence of multiple equilibria follows directly from our previous assumptions on the feasibility of poverty trap equilibrium. For any optimal social network  $X_{i0}$  that household  $i$  establishes, the superior equilibrium of well being can be described by

$$U_{iH}^*(X_{i0}) = \frac{C_{i0H}^*}{1-\theta} \left[ 1 + \rho^{\frac{1}{\theta}} (\alpha_2 k_2)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} (A_{i1H}^* - F((1-\delta_s)S_{i0} + X_{i0}'B_i)) \right]^{\frac{(1-\alpha_2)(1-\theta)}{\theta}}, \text{ where} \quad (25)$$

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<sup>27</sup> This condition rules out the possibility of downward mobility of the initially non-poor, which is reasonable given there is no uncertainty in the model.

$$A_{i1H}^*(X_{i0}) = \left( (\rho\alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0})}{C_{i1H}^*(X_{i0})} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F((1-\delta_s)S_{i0} + X_{i0}'B_i) ,$$

$$C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0}) = Y(A_{i0}, S_{i0}) - X_{i0}'K_i - \left[ \left( (\rho\alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0})}{C_{i1H}^*(X_{i0})} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F((1-\delta_s)S_{i0} + X_{i0}'B_i) - (1-\delta_A)A_{i0} \right] .$$

The last term on the right-hand side again indicates the optimal investment required to reach the superior equilibrium. Household  $i$  with optimal social network  $X_{i0}$  can achieve the high-level equilibrium  $U_{iH}^*(X_{i0})$  if and only if  $C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0}) \geq \bar{C}$ . Otherwise, they will converge slowly to the poverty trap equilibrium  $U_{iL}^*(X_{i0})$  with

$$C_{i0L}^*(X_{i0}) = Y(A_{i0}, S_{i0}) - X_{i0}'K_i - \left[ \left( (\rho\alpha_1 k_1) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0L}^*(X_{i0})}{C_{i1L}^*(X_{i0})} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_1}} - (1-\delta_A)A_{i0} \right] . \quad (26)$$

Perhaps more interestingly, and less obviously, household  $i$ 's ability to establish a network  $X_{i0}$  may affect the dynamic asset poverty line. Consider an initially poor household (whose  $A_{i0} < \underline{A}(S_{i0})$ ). It can gradually accumulate resources toward the high-level equilibrium, and thus escape future (but not current) poverty, if it establishes a productive network  $X_{i0}$  such that<sup>28</sup>

$$C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0}) \geq \bar{C} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (27)$$

$$k_1(A_{i0})^{\alpha_1} - X_{i0}'K_i - \left[ \left( (\rho\alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0})}{C_{i1H}^*(X_{i0})} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F((1-\delta_s)S_{i0} + X_{i0}'B_i) - (1-\delta_A)A_{i0} \right] \geq \bar{C} .$$

Therefore, according to (27), there exist three distinct avenues by which the initially poor can reach the high-level equilibrium. First, a poor household can undertake autarkic savings, just as in the previous section without social network capital. Note that unlike in

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<sup>28</sup> If there exists a network  $X_{i0} \neq \underline{0}$  such that  $C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0}) > 0$ , then  $U_{iH}^*(X_{i0}) > U_{iL}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})$  if  $C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0}) > C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})$  by assumptions. Thus the benefit of reaching the high-level equilibrium induces the household to make costly links, if it can afford to do so. Of course, if  $C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0}) > C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0}) > \bar{C}$ , then it is optimal for the household to graduate from poverty through autarkic savings.

the preceding case, a greater endowment of social network capital ( $S_{i0}$ ) reduces the savings required to reach  $\underline{A}(S_{i0})$  - as  $F'(\cdot) < 0$  - and thus to reach the high-level equilibrium in the future. Those well-endowed with social network capital are thus better positioned to escape poverty through an autarkic savings strategy. Second, the initially poor household can establish new social links that generate enough future social network capital to drive down  $\underline{A}(S_{i1})$  to the point that the high-return technology becomes optimal in the next period, without necessarily having to accumulate capital itself. Third, the household can invest in both social links to lower the asset threshold and private capital to augment its initial endowment and let it attain this lowered threshold level.

These latter two avenues indicate that the dynamic asset poverty threshold depends not only on household's initial endowments ( $A_{i0}, S_{i0}$ ), but also on the poor's opportunity to establish a social network,  $X_{i0}$ , that could generate the social network capital necessary for them to graduate from poverty. Thus factors that determine the poor's ability to establish a productive social network, such as the broader wealth distribution in the economy and the maximum social distance over which links are feasible in a given society, therefore also influence the initially poor's long-term well-being. Unlike standard poverty traps models in which one's initial conditions determine one's growth prospects, in a setting where social interactions can condition investment behavior, the initial conditions of the entire economy now matter.

Intuitively, (27) suggests that there exists a dynamic asset threshold conditional on a given endowed network structure,  $A_0^*(S_{i0} / X_{i0} = \underline{0})$ , such that for initially poor households with  $A_0^*(S_{i0} / X_{i0} = \underline{0}) \leq A_{i0} < \underline{A}(S_{i0})$ ,

$$C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0}) \geq \bar{C} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (28)$$

$$k_1(A_{i0})^{\alpha_1} - \left[ \left( (\rho\alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})}{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F((1-\delta_s)S_{i0}) - (1-\delta_A)A_{i0} \right] \geq \bar{C}.$$

Such households gradually escape poverty without needing to establish a new social network  $X_{i0}$  to accumulate their (already sufficient) social network capital. For them,

new social links are attractive if and only if the feasible network  $X_{i0}$  increases welfare by reducing the fixed costs of production enough to (at least) offset the costs of establishing the links – i.e., if it permits positive net intertemporal welfare gains. Therefore, the feasible network  $X_{i0}$  they will consider needs to follow

$$C_{i0H}^*(X_0) > C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0}) \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (29)$$

$$\left[ \left( (\rho\alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})}{C_{i1H}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F((1-\delta_s)S_{i0}) \right] - \left[ \left( (\rho\alpha_2 k_2) \cdot \left( \frac{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0})}{C_{i1H}^*(X_{i0})} \right)^\theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_2}} + F((1-\delta_s)S_{i0} + X'_{i0} B_i) \right] > X'_{i0} K_i$$

The intuition is that a household will invest in social network formation if the associated cost savings on physical capital investment outweigh the costs of establishing such a network.

Other initially poor households with  $A_{i0} < A_0^*(S_{i0} / X_{i0} = \underline{0}) < \underline{A}(S_{i0})$  cannot reach the high-level equilibrium without establishing new social links so as to accumulate additional social network capital and thereby make future adoption of the high-return technology optimal. Among the initially poor households (whose  $A_{i0} < \underline{A}(S_{i0})$ ), we can therefore further identify initial asset positions for which social network capital complements or substitutes for productive assets in facilitating upward economic mobility. Because those endowed with  $A_0^* \leq A_{i0} < \underline{A}(S_{i0})$  can escape from poverty even without inheriting or building social network capital, investment in  $X_{i0}$  is only optimal if it efficiently substitutes for productive asset accumulation – i.e., if establishing links is cheaper than capital investment for the household – in advancing economic mobility. For such households, social network capital reduces the savings required to graduate to the high-level equilibrium and thereby increases lifetime utility. In such cases, social network capital is a substitute for traditional capital accumulation in facilitating productivity and welfare growth.

For the initially poor households (whose  $A_{i0} < \underline{A}(S_{i0})$ ) endowed with  $A_{i0} < A_0^*$ , however, social network capital is a complement to traditional capital accumulation, in that it is needed in order to lower the asset poverty threshold and thereby enable the household to escape from poverty in the future. There are two distinct subpopulations

among those for whom social network capital is a complement to traditional capital in mediating economic mobility. First, those with  $A_0^*(S_{i_0} / X_{i_0} = \underline{0}) \leq A_{i_0} < A_0^*$  are endowed with sufficient social network capital that, even with social network capital depreciation,  $\delta_s$ , their extant social network capital suffices to enable traditional capital accumulation enough to reach the high-level equilibrium in period 1. Second, households with  $A_{i_0} < A_0^*(S_{i_0} / X_{i_0} = \underline{0}) < A_0^*$  need to form new social links – i.e., invest in  $X_{i_0}$  – to augment their initial social network capital endowment in order to complement asset accumulation necessary to escape future poverty. Their potential to escape poverty thus relies on the capacity and possibility to establish productive social network.

A still different equilibrium emerges for any household that fails to meet condition (28), either because it has inadequate endowments  $(A_{i_0}, S_{i_0})$  or because there is no feasible network  $X_{i_0} \in \Omega_{i_0}$  that would generate sufficient social network capital to let it reach the high-level equilibrium. Because establishing social links is costly and the household will never benefit from these, very poor and socially distant households optimally self-select out of social networks, choosing instead self-imposed social isolation. This follows from (26):

$$U_{iL}^*(X_{i_0} = \underline{0}) > U_{iL}^*(\widehat{X}_{i_0}), \quad \forall \widehat{X}_{i_0} \neq \underline{0}. \quad (30)$$

This captures the notion that for many poor people, social networks do not provide a viable escape route from long-term poverty, as Mogues and Carter (2005) and Adato et al. (2006) argue with reference to post-apartheid South Africa.

### 4.3 Patterns of social network-mediated economic mobility and immobility

So far we have treated households' optimal social networks as if they are exogenously given. Now we consider what happens as one inserts households into a broader society in which the mutual consent requirement governs social network formation, yielding an optimal network structure,  $X_{i_0}^*$ . Four distinct patterns of economic mobility and immobility emerge among the initially poor (whose  $A_{i_0} < \underline{A}(S_{i_0})$ ) upon realization of their optimal network  $X_{i_0}^*$ . In section 5 we explore, via simulation, the

process by which these patterns originate. Here we simply characterize these distinct subpopulations, building directly on the previous sub-section.

**(1) *Households who escape from poverty without forming social networks***

One subpopulation of the initially poor enjoy sufficient initial endowments,  $A_{i0} > A_0^*(S_{i0} / X_{i0} = \underline{0})$ , that they can accumulate resources autarkically, pulling themselves up to the high-level equilibrium in period 1 by their own bootstraps without investing in accumulating further social network capital. Their optimality condition can be characterized as

$$X_{i0}^* = \underline{0} \text{ and } U_i^* = U_{iH}^*(X_{i0}^* = \underline{0}). \quad (31)$$

Among this group, some households never consider establishing a new network, as all of their possible networks would yield non-positive net intertemporal utility gain, i.e.,  $U_{iH}^*(\bar{X}_{i0}) < U_{iH}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})$ ,  $\forall \bar{X}_{i0} \in \Omega_{i0}$ . Other households may be regrettably autarkic in their climb out of poverty, having failed to establish any preferred network,  $\hat{X}_{i0} \in \Omega_{i0}$  such that  $U_{iH}^*(\hat{X}_{i0}) > U_{iH}^*(X_{i0} = \underline{0})$ . This latter subgroup's first-best arrangement proves socially infeasible, leaving them worse off than they might have been under a different equilibrium social network configuration, but still able to exit poverty in time.

**(2) *Households who form social networks and thereby escape from poverty***

A second subpopulation of the initially poor successfully establishes networks with others, utilizing their accumulated productive social network capital so as to graduate from poverty. Their optimality condition can be characterized as

$$X_{i0}^* \neq \underline{0} \text{ and } U_i^* = U_{iH}^*(X_{i0}^*). \quad (32)$$

This subpopulation's experience of a socially-mediated climb out of poverty is the phenomenon that excites the imagination of the most ardent fans of social capital as an instrument for poverty reduction. Among this group, there are likewise two distinct subgroups. Those initially poor households with  $A_{i0} \geq A_0^*(S_{i0} / X_{i0} = \underline{0})$  find it cheaper to use social network in mediating economic mobility, but they can escape the poverty trap regardless. Social capital improves their welfare but it does not fundamentally alter the qualitative path they follow over time.

By contrast, the crucial subpopulation is those with  $A_{i_0} < A_0^*(S_{i_0} / X_{i_0} = \underline{0})$ . Their escape from poverty will not be possible if they cannot build a productive social network. Their initial endowment of both assets and social network capital is insufficient for them to climb out of poverty in time unless they can find other households willing to link with them. This subpopulation is fortunate in that the underlying attribute distribution in the economy generated sufficient social proximity that others were willing to link with these poor households.

**(3) *Households involuntarily excluded from social networks and trapped in poverty***

Others are not so fortunate. The next subpopulation of the initially poor could escape from poverty if they were able to establish one or more of their preferred social networks. However, they are rebuffed by those they approach for possible links and in the absence of their desired social network capital, they cannot accumulate enough traditional capital to climb out of poverty. Involuntary social exclusion thus conspires with meager initial asset endowments to trap these households in long-term poverty. A bit more formally, although there exists at least one network  $\tilde{X}_{i_0} \in \Omega_{i_0}$  such that  $C_{i_0H}^*(\tilde{X}_{i_0}) > \bar{C}$ , no such network arises in equilibrium. Thus they resort to  $X_{i_0}^* = \underline{0}$ , although this is not their preferred network. Their optimality condition is represented by

$$X_{i_0}^* = \underline{0}, U_i^* = U_{iL}^*(X_{i_0}^* = \underline{0}) \text{ and } \exists \tilde{X}_{i_0} \in \Omega_{i_0} \text{ such that } C_{i_0H}^*(\tilde{X}_{i_0}) > \bar{C}. \quad (33)$$

This constrained optimum best illustrates how social networks can fail the poor because of the mutual consent condition that underpins the formation of social links.

**(4) *Households who choose social isolation and remain trapped in poverty***

The final subpopulation comprises those with especially meager endowments,  $A_{i_0} < A_0^*(S_{i_0} / X_{i_0} = \underline{0})$ , who have no possibility to escape poverty no matter the social networks they create. None of their feasible networks,  $X_{i_0} \in \Omega_{i_0}$ , would generate sufficient social network capital to complement traditional capital accumulation in fostering upward economic mobility. Since links are costly to establish and only yield welfare gains if one employs the high-return technology they will never optimally choose, this subpopulation does not value social network capital and therefore does not establish any links in equilibrium. Their optimality condition can be characterized as

$$X_{i0}^* = \underline{0}, U_i^* = U_{iL}^*(X_{i0}^* = \underline{0}) \text{ and } C_{i0H}^*(\tilde{X}_{i0}) < \bar{C} \text{ for all } \tilde{X}_{i0} \in \Omega_{i0}. \quad (34)$$

Since  $X_{i0}^* = \underline{0}$  is their top-ranked network choice in  $\Omega_{i0}^{Ranked}$ , they self-select out of social networks, rejecting any proposals made to them by others in the economy. The result is socially isolated, long-term poverty.

These distinct mobility and immobility patterns are a product of the underlying distribution of endowments in society and the limits to social interaction. The next section uses simulation methods to illustrate these patterns and further examine the underlying socioeconomic structures of social network formation that affect economic mobility.

#### 4.4 Basic comparative statics

Following from (30), the potential of initially poor household  $i$  to escape poverty depends on its initial endowment,  $(A_{i0}, S_{i0})$ , the parameters of the production technology  $(k_1, k_2, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$  and preferences  $(\rho, \theta)$ , depreciation rates on both types of capital  $(\delta_A, \delta_S)$ , and the conditions that govern its ability to establish social networks and the net intertemporal benefits it could derive from social network capital  $(K_i, B_i, F(S_{ii}))$ . These effects are all quite intuitive. A household's initial endowment of both physical and social network capital contributes unambiguously toward its potential to grow out of poverty. Lower asset depreciation rates decrease the savings required to adopt the high return production technology and graduate from poverty. Therefore, they unambiguously increase household's upward mobility possibility by enhancing household's capacity to meet this saving requirement autarkically as well as to find social network a productive mechanism for growth. Whether or not these stimulate potential for social network in mediating growth depends largely on socioeconomic conditions, which govern pattern of network formation in the economy.

Increased productivity of the low-return production technology  $(k_1, \alpha_1)$  unambiguously increases household's initial income, which then increases its ability to save and to accumulate its way out of poverty. Improved productivity of the high-return technology  $(k_2, \alpha_2)$  implies greater savings incentives. This effect could be amplified (or muted) by household intertemporal preferences, as reflected in either its time discounting  $(\rho)$  or its degree of elasticity of intertemporal substitution  $(\theta)$ . All else equal, the higher

a household's future discounting, the more required investment it needs in order to converge to the high-level equilibrium.<sup>29</sup> The Euler equation meanwhile suggests that the higher  $\theta$ , the higher the return on investment in equilibrium, which implies less investment needed to reach the high-level equilibrium. Therefore, all else equal, higher  $\theta$  increases a household's potential to escape poverty either by making the necessary autarkic savings affordable or by making social network construction attractive and productive for mediating growth.

The ease with which households can form social links likewise matters. *Ceteris paribus*, a household will place greater value on a link the lower the cost of establishing it ( $K_i$ ), the higher the benefits the link generates ( $B_i$ ), and the more productive the social network capital is in high return production, i.e., for greater  $|F'(S_{it})|$ . We would expect fewer socially excluded or isolated households because social network formation becomes more attractive, as well as more use of social networks as a cheaper substitute for autarkic physical capital accumulation by mobile households.

These simple comparative statics, however, do not imply anything about the effect of these variables on the actual capacity of social networks to mediate growth. Nor can we infer anything explicitly about the effects of socioeconomic structure, other constraints and/or social interaction opportunities on the equilibrium social networks of multiple and heterogeneous households, which condition the effects of the above variables and parameters on the poor's capacity to grow their way out of poverty. Analytical solution of those effects is intractable. Therefore, in the next section we use numerical simulations to explore these points.

## 5. Simulation of endogenous network formation and economic mobility

We now simulate households' long-run equilibria for randomly generated economies. The analysis assumes 17 households,<sup>30</sup> each endowed with randomly

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<sup>29</sup> For the initial poor, (27) implies  $\frac{C_{i0H}^*(X_{i0})}{C_{iH}^*(X_{i0})} < 1$ .

<sup>30</sup> This arbitrary number was chosen for computational and presentational reasons, to generate a big enough population to demonstrate the complex interlinkages, but small enough to display visually and to remain tractable in solving the complex matching and optimization problem.

generated  $(A_0, S_0)$ , cumulatively representing the economy's endowment distribution,  $\lambda(A_0, S_0)$ . Our goal is to illustrate the distinguishable roles of social network capital in the economic (im)mobility of the initially poor, as identified in section 4.3. One core result is that mobility and immobility patterns and the potential for social network capital to mediate economic growth vary with the initial structure of the economy, represented here by  $\lambda(A_0, S_0)$  and with other variables that condition endogenous network formation among households in the economy. Two otherwise identical households, dropped into two quite different economies, can follow markedly different patterns. Economic mobility is thus, at least in part, socially constructed.

Figures 5-10 each depict a randomly generated economy. Households are represented by their initial endowment positions plotted on the  $(A_0, S_0)$  plane. Their long-run equilibria (either high- or low-level) are represented by the shapes in the plots. A dot represents a household that enjoys the high-level equilibrium in period 1, a triangle represents a socially isolated household, and an "x" represents a socially excluded one. The equilibrium bilateral links are represented by lines connecting two households. In each figure, a downward sloping curve reflects the static asset poverty threshold  $A(S_0)$ . All those to the southwest of that line (shaded in blue) initially (in period 0) choose the low-productivity technology. We focus our discussion on this subpopulation, on the economic mobility (or immobility) of the initially poor.

Figure 5 provides a simple illustration of the distinct patterns that emerge from the baseline model.<sup>31</sup> The initially poor who escape from poverty without forming new social networks are represented by the household with initial endowment (3,7). Those who form social networks and escape poverty fall into two sub-groups. Some climb out of poverty through solidarity among the initially poor (the cluster of the four households with the lowest  $S_0$  endowments), while others successfully link to the initially non-poor (the household initially endowed with (6,5)). Then there are those who remain trapped in poverty, either due to social exclusion (the two households marked "x") or to self-

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<sup>31</sup> This particular set of random endowments, which we label "Economy 1", will be used again in Figures 12 and 13 to demonstrate particular points. The label is meant to facilitate visual comparison across these figures.

imposed social isolation (the three households with the lowest  $A_0$  endowments). These patterns obviously vary with the parameterization chosen, as discussed above with respect to the model's simple comparative statics. Appendix 3 discusses our sensitivity analysis by exploring the impact of deviations from the baseline parameterization in 100 randomly generated economies.

Figure 6 then abstracts from the specific households and their links to map the space of these different mobility and immobility patterns. The horizontal line at the dynamic asset threshold  $A_0^*$  represents the dynamic asset poverty line in the absence of social network capital, as in Carter and Barrett (2006). Those households in area A have a large enough endowment of productive assets,  $A_0$ , to save in the first period and thereby accumulate sufficient traditional capital to reach the high-level equilibrium without recourse to social network capital. Some households in region A might nonetheless establish social links as a substitute for savings and traditional capital accumulation. But households in region A are all independently economically mobile.

Those households beneath the dynamic asset threshold  $A_0^*$  all require social network capital in order to exit poverty. They can be divided into three distinct groups. Those in area D, whose initial endowments place them above the static asset poverty line with social network capital,  $\underline{A}(S_0)$ , are initially non-poor because of their social network capital endowment in spite of their otherwise-insufficient endowment of traditional capital. Not only do they enjoy the high-level equilibrium in period 1, but they are able to reach the high-level equilibrium in period 0, unlike those with somewhat greater traditional capital but lesser social network capital endowments.

The dynamic asset threshold  $A_0^*(S_0 / X_0 = \underline{0})$  distinguishes among the final two groups. Those in area B are endowed with sufficient social network capital to complement productive asset accumulation and escape from poverty, even without forming new social links. While social network capital is necessary for their economic mobility, their initial endowment suffices to shelter them from depending on others' willingness to establish new links with them. By contrast, others (in area C) can only make it out of poverty if they successfully establish new social links and thereby augment their initial social network capital endowment as a complement to traditional capital accumulation. This

group's economic mobility thus depends fundamentally on the underlying structure of the economy, in particular on their social distance from others and the feasible distance over which links can form within the economy. Figure 6's mapping of endowment space thus underscores the multiple roles social network capital can play in conditioning household economic growth paths, either serving as a substitute for or a complement to traditional productive assets, enabling immediate or delayed exit from poverty, and ensuring independent, albeit social network-mediated mobility, or requiring the establishment of new social links non-cooperatively.

Figures 7-10 illustrate the impact of the initial socioeconomic structure of the economy on the mobility of the initially poor. Each figure focuses on a distinct type of initially poor household – from group A, B or C in Figure 6 – and displays four panels that differ solely by the initial distribution of households in the economy. The southeastern panel in each figure shows the case of a highly polarized economy, so that we can underscore the impact of socio-economic polarization on the economic mobility of the poor, a point raised insightfully by Mogue and Carter (2005).

Figures 7 and 8 depict the initially poor who are autarkically mobile, in the former case irrespective of social network capital, in the case of Figure 8, thanks to their initial endowment of social network capital. Neither household *a* in Figure 7 nor household *b* in Figure 8 need to establish social links in order to climb out of poverty from period 0 to period 1. Their ability to reach the high-level equilibrium is thus not affected by structure of economy. But their choice as to whether or not to form new links with others varies with the underlying structure of the economy in which they find themselves. In the (southeastern) case of the polarized economy, neither has any incentive to invest in links with others and thus climbs out of poverty without any new social relationships. In the southwestern case in each Figure, they choose to link with other initially poor households only, while in the northwestern case in each Figure they choose to link also with initially non-poor households. Their social arrangements are the byproduct of the underlying endowment distribution in the economy even though they in no sense depend on further social relations to reach the high-level equilibrium. This has an important implication for empirical studies. The presence in a sample of independently economically mobile households who may or may not find it optimal to build social networks can generate

considerable cross-sample differences in the correlation between household-level economic mobility and social network density.

Figure 9 illustrates perhaps the most interesting case. Here we see how the underlying structure of the economy conditions economic mobility for some of the initially poor, those (such as household *c*) in what Figure 6 labeled area C. In the northwestern panel, a link with a socially proximate household that is initially non-poor enables socially-mediated exit from poverty. In the northeastern panel, economic mobility is achieved through multiple links with other, similarly initially poor households in area C. In the lower two panels of Figure 9, however, household *c* gets trapped in poverty. In the southwestern case, there are socially proximate households with which it would like to link, but it is rebuffed in its proposal to form a network. The result is social exclusion in equilibrium. In the polarized economy<sup>32</sup> case, there is no socially proximate household with whom a connection would be beneficial, so the household prefers no links and thus settles into a socially isolated equilibrium. The subpopulation represented by C in Figure 9 is thus the group for whom social networks and the underlying structure of society fundamentally shape economic mobility (or immobility).

Finally, as shown in Figure 10, some households are so destitute initially that they almost never find social relations sufficiently beneficial to enable a climb out of poverty. They are thus socially isolated in almost all configurations of the economy. The key thing to note about social isolation is that, at least under the parameterization we employ, it depends primarily on a household's initial endowment of traditional, productive capital. Those who begin too poor simply can't leverage their meager endowments no matter how skillfully they interconnect themselves with others. This is underscored more sharply in Figure 11 which plots the results from 100 randomly generated economies. There emerges a clear asset threshold below which individuals lose any incentive to establish social networks with others. Social exclusion and socially-mediated climbs out of poverty are, however, generally quite difficult to predict due to the fact that those patterns depend so heavily on the underlying structure of the economy.

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<sup>32</sup> We label this particular initial endowment "Economy 2" for further use in Figure 13.

## 6. Crowding-in possibilities created by endogenous social networks

The endogeneity of social networks can quite fundamentally affect prospective interventions by governmental or non-governmental agencies. We illustrate this with reference to one specific problem of particular relevance to poverty reduction programs: transfers to the poor. Under the maintained (implicit) hypothesis that agents' social networks are exogenously fixed, Cox et al. (1995) and Cox et al. (2004), among others, argue that public transfers can crowd out private transfers because the altruistic or insurance motivation for a transfer is diminished by public support. Attempts to aid the poor could thus be thwarted by induced private responses to public interventions.

If, however, households' networks of social relationships are formed endogenously, then transfers could change the configuration of networks. Indeed, if social networks are endogenous, well-targeted public transfers may have the opposite effect to that posited in the existing literature. Transfers can crowd in private support by reducing the social distance between individuals and thereby encouraging the creation of new social links, enabling recipients to access newfound social network capital and to escape from poverty. Such crowding-in effects depend, however, on the structure of the underlying economy, reinforcing a core point of the preceding section.

We illustrate this crowding-in possibility by repeating the previous simulations, but now adding targeted transfers to specific households. Figure 12 visualizes our base case without transfers, overlaying four specific households – *e*, *f*, *g* and *h* – with region C identified in figure 6. The upper two rows of Figure 13 then illustrate the possible crowding-in effects for four distinct cases of transfers to the households depicted in Figure 12 – using exactly the same initial endowments, i.e., economy 1. The bottom row of Figure 13 presents two different cases of transfers to every poor household in a polarized economy (economy 2, previously depicted without transfers in the southeastern quadrant of Figure 9).

The upper left example in Figure 13 shows the case of a household (*e*) that was previously too poorly endowed with capital to make costly formation of social networks attractive. In the absence of a transfer, it therefore chooses social isolation and persistent

poverty, as shown in Figure 12. But with the benefit of a modest transfer,<sup>33</sup> and given the social proximity of other households, this transfer encourages  $e$  to link to others, enabling it to leverage social network capital to escape poverty. Moreover, the induced reformation of social networks also permits two other households to escape from poverty. These households were socially excluded in the no-transfer economy depicted in Figure 12 but now are able to band together, using newly created social network capital to access the high-level equilibrium in period 1. The central left graphic in Figure 13 shows a qualitatively similar result, this time with a 20% smaller transfer (0.8 units of  $A$ ) because the recipient (household  $g$ ) is more proximate to other households than household  $e$  was, *ex ante*, in Figure 12. It therefore requires less of a transfer to induce the creation of new social links, and thus an expansion of social network capital that not only lifts the transfer recipient out of poverty, but also two other households that would otherwise remain persistently poor. Targeting plainly matters, as we emphasize below.

The upper right example in Figure 13 shows a similar effect, in this case through a one unit transfer to household  $f$ , which was socially excluded in the no-transfer setting (Figure 12), but now links to three other households, one of which was already able to climb out of poverty through autarkic savings, another of which was, like  $f$ , socially excluded but can leverage its new social link to accumulate enough social network capital to climb out of poverty by period 1, and the third of which expands its pre-existing social network.

Lest it seem that transfers have an automatic beneficial effect in inducing the creation of new social network capital, the right central graphic in Figure 13 illustrates how even relatively large transfers – 1.5 units of  $A$  to household  $h$  – can fail to generate poverty reduction gains when they are poorly targeted. Although the transfer brings household  $h$  right to the threshold of autarkic escape from poverty, makes social linkages attractive to it and clearly leaves it better off than it would have been without the transfer,  $h$ 's relative social distance from other households leave it socially excluded and persistently poor even in the wake of a relatively large transfer.

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<sup>33</sup> This transfer is just one unit of  $A$ , worth one-quarter of the poor recipient household's initial capital stock and just 0.6% of the wealth of this 17-person economy.

Transfers do not have to induce the creation of social links with those who are already able to climb out of poverty in order to generate crowding-in effects. Even in a highly polarized economy, such as that previously depicted in the lower right quadrant of Figure 9, transfers to multiple poor households can stimulate the emergence of a solidarity network among the poor that enables several of them to escape poverty. This effect is shown in the lower left portion of Figure 13, which simulates the transfer of two units of  $A$  to each ex ante poor household. This transfer is clearly welfare-improving for all, but only facilitates an exit from poverty for some, the five households who establish a solidarity network from which they optimally exclude one other poor beneficiary household and which three other poor beneficiaries do not wish to join, preferring social isolation to costly linkage to the new network.

However, the induced social network capital creation effect that stimulates economic mobility for some ex ante poor households is by no means automatic. Too meager a transfer can improve recipients' welfare but fail to generate the bigger gains associated with a leap to the high-level equilibrium, as illustrated in the lower right graphic in Figure 13, which shows the result of transfers to all poor households of just one unit of  $A$  instead of two units, as in the previous example. Collectively, these examples underscore how important core targeting questions – who? how much? – are to the poverty reduction effects of transfer programs and how endogenous social network formation fundamentally affects the efficacy of such programs. Well-targeted transfers can lift even non-recipients out of long-term poverty, while poorly-targeted transfers can fail to facilitate economic mobility even for recipients.

## **7. Conclusions**

Social network capital can be an important facilitator of upward mobility to escape persistent poverty. But costly social networking is no panacea. Not all households find it worthwhile to link to others and some will be rebuffed in their efforts to build a network. Moreover, the usefulness of social networks depends fundamentally on the underlying structure of the economy in which agents reside. In some settings, well-targeted public transfers to selected poor households can catalyze the creation of new social network capital, thereby multiplying the poverty reduction effects of interventions.

We illustrate these points by developing a highly stylized model of heterogeneous households that make consumption, investment and social networking decisions in a dynamic, interlinked setting. Depending on their initial endowment positions, social network capital substitutes for productive assets for some households, while for others it complements their productive assets in facilitating productivity growth and economic mobility.

One fundamental point that emerges from this exercise is that the exclusionary mechanisms necessary for people to be trapped in poverty may arise endogenously due to the inherent costliness of establishing and maintaining social links. In our setting, with multiple technologies that create locally increasing returns to productive capital but no credit market to permit individuals to borrow the capital necessary to exit poverty in time, costless access to social network capital would provide an alternate pathway out of poverty, a socially-mediated solution to a market failure. When establishing social links is costly, however, some households may opt out of networks, choosing social isolation and persistent poverty instead. And when the net benefits of social links are asymmetric, other households may desire social links that would help them climb out of poverty, but are rebuffed by prospective links and thus left in a state of social exclusion and persistent poverty. These social exclusionary mechanisms are economy-specific, depending fundamentally on the underlying socioeconomic conditions that determine feasibility of social interaction and the net benefits to agents of social links. As a result, four distinct mobility and immobility patterns may co-exist among the initially poor: (1) exit from poverty through autarkic saving, (2) socially mediated exit from poverty, (3) a poverty trap due to social exclusion, and (4) a poverty trap associated with self-imposed social isolation. Although in many ways this model is kept quite artificially simple, it suffices to illustrate that the causal links between social network capital and economic mobility are highly context specific and need not be empirically identifiable in a way that is generalizable across economies.

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
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
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
**Figure 1:** Locally increasing return production technology




**Figure 2:** Locally increasing return production technology when acquiring more social networking capital ( $S'_t > S_t$ )



**Figure 3: Example economy with  $N = \{1,2,3,4,5\}$  and initial distribution  $\lambda(A_0, S_0)$**



**Figure 4: Example of endogenous network formation**



$$\Omega_1^{Ranked} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} x(12) \\ x(13) \end{matrix} \right\} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (0) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (0) \end{matrix} \right\}$$

$$\Omega_2^{Ranked} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} x(21) \\ x(23) \end{matrix} \right\} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (0) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (0) \end{matrix} \right\}$$

$$\Omega_3^{Ranked} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} x(31) \\ x(32) \\ x(34) \end{matrix} \right\} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (0) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (1) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (0) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (1) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (0) \\ (0) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (0) \\ (0) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (1) \\ (0) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (0) \\ (0) \end{matrix} \right\}$$

$$\Omega_4^{Ranked} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} x(43) \\ x(45) \end{matrix} \right\} = \left\{ \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (1) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (0) \\ (0) \end{matrix}, \begin{matrix} (1) \\ (0) \end{matrix} \right\}$$

$$\Omega_5^{Ranked} = \{x(54)\} = \{1,0\}$$

The progress of interaction procedure is shown below, “ $\rightarrow$ ” stands for “propose to”

	<b>Round 1</b>	<b>Round 2</b>	<b>Round 3</b>
<b>HH 1:</b>	$\rightarrow 2$ No	$\rightarrow 2$ No	
	$\rightarrow 3$ Match	$\rightarrow 3$ Match $\xrightarrow{\text{established}} X_1^* = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	
<b>HH 2:</b>	$\rightarrow 3$ No	$\rightarrow 3$ Match $X_2^* = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$	
<b>HH 3:</b>	$\rightarrow 1$ Match	$\rightarrow 1$ Match	
	$\rightarrow 4$ No	$\rightarrow 2$ Match $X_3^* = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$	
<b>HH 4:</b>	$\rightarrow 5$ Match $X_4^* = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$		
<b>HH 5:</b>	$\rightarrow 4$ Match $X_5^* = 1$		

Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium yields the set of links at equilibrium:  
 $g^* = \{13,23,45\}$ .

**Figure 5: Basic simulation illustration**










Figure 6: The space of social mobility and immobility in one simulated economy




**Figure 7: Different patterns for an autarkically mobile household**




**Figure 8: Different patterns for a household autarkically mobile given its  $S_0$**



**Figure 9: Different patterns for a household whose mobility depends on social links**



**Figure 10: Different patterns for a destitute, economically immobile household**



**Figure 11: Equilibrium social networks and long-run equilibria for 100 economies**






Figure 12: Households and regions combined in a simulated economy




**Figure 13: Targeted transfers and “crowding in” effects**




## Appendix 1: Network simulation statistics

**Figure A1: Sample proportion of those getting their first best network vs. number of households feasible for social link**  
(100 economies of 17 households)



**Figure A2: Sample proportion of those getting their first best network vs. number of households in the first best network**  
(100 economies of 17 households)



## Appendix 2: Parameterization of the simulation

### Baseline Case:

1. Utility:;  $\theta = 0, \rho = 0.95, \bar{C} = 2$ .
2. Production technology:  

$$F(S_{it}) = k_3 k_4^{-S_{it}}, k_1 = 9, k_2 = 8.5, k_3 = 9, k_4 = 1.2, \alpha_1 = 0.25, \alpha_2 = 0.5, F = 9$$
3. Social interaction:  $\bar{d} = 5$
4. Cost/benefit of link:  $K_i(j) = \theta_1(d(i, j)) \left( \frac{A_{j0}}{A_{i0}} \right), B_i(j) = \theta_2 A_{j0} - \theta_3 |A_{j0} - A_{i0}|$   

$$\theta_1 = 0.125, \theta_2 = 0.4, \theta_3 = 0.33$$
5. Asset accumulation:  $\delta_S = \delta_A = 0.05$
6. Endowment:  $A_0 \in [0, 20], S_0 \in [0, 10]$ .

### Deviation from the baseline case:

For each randomly generated economy with  $\lambda(A_0, S_0)$ ,  $N=17$  with randomly generated initial endowments  $(A_0, S_0)$ :  $A_0 \in [0, 20], \mu_{A_0} = 8, \sigma_{A_0}^2 = 15$   
 $S_0 \in [0, 10], \mu_{S_0} = 5, \sigma_{S_0}^2 = 10$

### Parameterization and functional forms for deviation cases

(Holding other specifications constant for each case):

- |                            |                          |                               |                              |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (1) $\theta \rightarrow 1$ | (7) $\theta_1 = 0.03125$ | (13) $\theta_2 = 0.7$         | (19) $\sigma_{S_0}^2 = 2.5$  |
| (2) $\bar{d} = 1$          | (8) $\theta_1 = 0.1875$  | (14) $\sigma_{A_0}^2 = 7.5$   | (20) $\sigma_{S_0}^2 = 15$   |
| (3) $\bar{d} = 3$          | (9) $\theta_1 = 0.21875$ | (15) $\sigma_{A_0}^2 = 3.75$  | (21) $\sigma_{S_0}^2 = 17.5$ |
| (4) $\bar{d} = 6$          | (10) $\theta_2 = 0.2$    | (16) $\sigma_{A_0}^2 = 22.5$  |                              |
| (5) $\bar{d} = 7$          | (11) $\theta_2 = 0.3$    | (17) $\sigma_{A_0}^2 = 26.25$ |                              |
| (6) $\theta_1 = 0.0625$    | (12) $\theta_2 = 0.6$    | (18) $\sigma_{S_0}^2 = 5$     |                              |

### Appendix 3: Sensitivity Analysis

This Appendix briefly describes the results of sensitivity analysis with respect to several key parameters. The leftmost column of Table A1 identifies the relevant change to the underlying parameter value, relative to the baseline (details in Appendix 2). Table A1 reports the effects of deviations from the baseline model parameterization (holding everything else constant) on equilibrium social network formation in the economy (the first two numeric columns refer to the whole economy, the next two columns to initially poor households only), and (in the final eight columns) how the parameter change affects the proportion of initially poor households that are (1) economically mobile through autarkic savings, (2) economically mobile utilizing successfully established social network, (3) trapped in poverty due to social exclusion, and (4) trapped in poverty due to social isolation.

The first row shows what happens as we move away from the extreme baseline case, ( $\theta = 0$ ) in which households have maximal willingness to shift consumption across periods, to unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ( $\theta \rightarrow 1$ ). Despite the fact that the number of links formed in the economy and by the initially poor decrease in most economies, increasing  $\theta$ , all else equal, results in more economic mobility via either autarkic saving or social network formation, and fewer households trapped in poverty due to either social exclusion or social isolation. Thus individual preferences plainly matter to mobility and network linkage patterns. But the relationship between the extent of social linkage and economic mobility need not be unambiguously positive.

Social link formation obviously responds to changes in the maximal distance permitting social interaction,  $\bar{d}$ . Rows (2)-(5) present the effects of different directions and magnitudes of change in  $\bar{d}$ . Intuitively, as the space for social interaction shrinks radically, by 80%, there is of course a universal sharp reduction in equilibrium links formed, including by the initially poor. This also leads to an increase in autarkically mobile households in 81% of the economies, as social network capital is less commonly feasible as a substitute for physical capital accumulation, and to an increase in incidence of social exclusion (isolation) in most (all) economies. Less intuitively, for a smaller

decrease (40%) in  $\bar{d}$ , link formation may actually increase. In 63% of the economies, the number of links formed grows; this figure is far higher among the initially poor (92%). The reason is that a narrower domain of feasible social interaction induces more reciprocity of desired links among socially proximate clusters of households. With fewer feasible or desired links, households are more likely to seek, and in equilibrium make, links with those with whom they wish to form a network (see Figure A2 in Appendix 1). Somewhat lower  $\bar{d}$  encourages more links among the poor, as they become less likely to seek out – and be rejected by – better-off households within the domain of socially feasible interactions. The results is greater economic mobility using social networks and less using autarkic savings; as well as more self-selected social isolation and less social exclusion. These are especially interesting and somewhat counterintuitive results that merit further research in the future.

Increasing  $\bar{d}$  generates corresponding results, with large increases generating less mobility via social networks and fewer links formed by the initially poor due to the increased likelihood of unrequited invitations to better-off households. The core finding is thus that social network formation and economic mobility patterns are not monotone in  $\bar{d}$ . Increasing the social distance across which individuals can feasibly connect does not guarantee more links or mobility in an economy. It may merely lead to greater unsuccessful attempts to link, with adverse consequences for some initially poor households whose aspirations go unfulfilled.

Rows (6)-(9) show the effect of changing the gross cost of establishing social links, while rows (10)-(13) show the equivalent effects of changing the gross benefits of social links. The effects are generally as one would expect. Increased costs (decreased benefits) of social link formation reduce the number of links formed overall, and result in greater social isolation. The effects on social exclusion are, again, not monotone in either costs or benefits because of the complex matching problem in economies of many heterogeneous agents.

The final two blocks of columns in Table A1 explore how dispersion in the initial endowments of physical and social network capital affect mobility and social network formation. The results are reasonably intuitive. As the standard deviation of endowments (of physical or social network capital) increases in the economy, fewer social links result,

and agents switch from socially mediated to autarkic growth strategies. The effects on patterns of social exclusion and isolation are less clear, again due to the inherent complexities of multi-agent matching. This is of course consistent with the common empirical observation that lower asset inequality is positively associated with higher rates of economic growth.

**Table A1: Effects on Equilibrium Social Network and Mobility Patterns**

(all figures reflect the proportion of economies experiencing change of that sign)

Model Specification	Number of links formed in economy		Number of links formed by initially poor agents		Economies with change in the mobility of initially poor agents							
					Economically Mobile via Autarkic Savings		Economically Mobile via Social Networks		Trapped in Poverty: Social Exclusion		Trapped in Poverty: Socially Isolation	
Deviation from Baseline <sup>34</sup>	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
<b>Utility:</b>												
(1) Decrease elasticity of intertemporal subst. ( $\theta \rightarrow 1$ )	0.00	1.00	0.12	0.64	1.00	0.00	0.64	0.00	0.00	0.84	0.00	1.00
<b>Social Interaction: <math>\bar{d}</math></b>												
(2) 80% Decrease	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.81	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.55	1.00	0.00
(3) 40% Decrease	0.63	0.27	0.92	0.10	0.10	0.35	0.45	0.20	0.20	0.36	0.27	0.09
(4) 20% Increase	0.42	0.15	0.28	0.27	0.18	0.09	0.10	0.27	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
(5) 40% Increase	0.36	0.27	0.25	0.36	0.00	0.09	0.09	0.36	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Network Costs: <math>K_i(j)</math></b>												
(6) 50% Decrease	0.64	0.18	0.55	0.36	0.18	0.18	0.27	0.56	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.27
(7) 75% Decrease	0.85	0.10	0.73	0.09	0.00	0.28	0.45	0.09	0.16	0.10	0.00	0.40
(8) 50% Increase	0.28	0.64	0.45	0.36	0.10	0.36	0.45	0.26	0.18	0.31	0.18	0.00
(9) 75% Increase	0.09	0.73	0.18	0.45	0.18	0.09	0.09	0.36	0.18	0.18	0.27	0.00
<b>Network Benefits: <math>B_i(j)</math></b>												
(10) 50% Decrease	0.18	0.55	0.15	0.73	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.64	0.55	0.20	0.37	0.00
(11) 75% Decrease	0.18	0.82	0.09	0.72	0.18	0.10	0.20	0.64	0.18	0.36	0.90	0.00
(12) 50% Increase	0.57	0.21	0.45	0.27	0.00	0.30	0.37	0.19	0.27	0.00	0.09	0.18
(13) 75% Increase	0.64	0.27	0.73	0.27	0.10	0.36	0.64	0.27	0.20	0.36	0.18	0.18
<b>Endowment:</b> (holding mean assets constant)												
<b>Dispersion of A</b>												
(14) 50% Decrease	0.55	0.24	0.73	0.18	0.00	0.40	0.82	0.18	0.36	0.45	0.78	0.15
(15) 75% Decrease	0.73	0.15	0.73	0.27	0.00	0.30	0.82	0.09	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
(16) 50% Increase	0.18	0.73	0.00	0.73	0.27	0.27	0.04	0.36	0.55	0.30	0.21	0.73
(17) 75% Increase	0.09	0.91	0.18	0.73	0.45	0.09	0.20	0.75	0.36	0.40	0.75	0.15
<b>Dispersion of S</b>												
(18) 50% Decrease	0.12	0.64	0.05	0.82	0.00	0.12	0.27	0.37	0.28	0.31	0.64	0.20
(19) 75% Decrease	0.20	0.75	0.00	1.00	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.56	0.30	0.33	0.82	0.18
(20) 50% Increase	0.18	0.75	0.15	0.79	0.00	0.36	0.09	0.78	0.10	0.42	0.81	0.12
(21) 75% Increase	0.18	0.82	0.18	0.82	0.29	0.22	0.18	0.82	0.09	0.55	0.82	0.18

<sup>34</sup> Proportions do not always add up to one since there are economies with no change in some categories.